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NOTES
THE CASE OF THE ILL-GOTTEN INTELLIGENCE
The three defendants, during April, 2090, were all army
officers of the Federation of North America serving in the
Republic of Pangaea.
Two of the defendants, Lieutenant Short and Major
Saster, were Army Intelligence officers assigned to the 17th
Army Intelligence Detachment (A. I. Det.). Maj. Saster was
the officer in charge of the Prisoner Interrogation Teams.
Lt. Short was one of his interrogators.
The third defendant, Captain Gee, was attached to the
6th Pangaean Prisoner of War Interment Camp as an adviser
to the Army of Pangaea.
Sometime during April, 2090, Federation forces cap-
tured an enemy soldier named Quyet Thang. Quyet Thang
was identified by other prisoners as a ranking officer of the
enemy's 22nd Regiment, confirming information from other
sources. Based upon Quyet Thang's rank, position and other
intelligence, it was felt that he had information of immediate
tactical value to the Federation and Pangaean forces; there-
fore, Thang was evacuated to a rear area and turned over
to the 17th A. I. Detachment.
Lt. Short and an interpreter began interrogating Thang
on the morning of 16 April 2090. On the evening of 16 April,
Lt. Short sent the following message to Maj. Saster:
"Sir:
"Thang admits he is the I & R (Intelligence and Reconnaissance)
officer of the 22nd Regiment but that's all he will say. I talked to the
two prisoners captured with him and they said they had been recon-
noitering Federation positions and Thang had sent his info back to the
22nd Base Camp. They further stated that they and Thang were mov-
ing to an unknown point to rendezvous with the 22nd which would
be moving to attack a Federation unit.
"Sir, the 22nd is a strong, well-armed unit near full strength. If
they surprise a smaller Federation unit, it could be a massacre. On the
other hand, if Thang can be made to pin point the rendezvous point
in time for us to prepare a proper welcome, we could really put the
hurt on the 22nd.
"Thang won't talk for us, but I believe he has information of im-
mense tactical value to Federation forces; therefore, I recommend he
be turned over to the Pangaeans so he can be made to talk.
Lt. Short"
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Maj. Saster, upon receiving Lt. Short's recommendation,
called Cpt. Gee. Maj. Saster and 1Cpt. Gee agreed that the gist
of this conversation was as follows:
(1) Quyet Thang, an important enemy officer, had been
captured.
(2) He was withholding needed information from Fed-
eration interrogators.
(3) Cpt. Gee was to pick up Thang and turn him over
to the Pangaeans to "extract the info by any means possible."
Cpt. Gee, as ordered by Maj. Saster, delivered Quyet
Thang to the Pangaean Prisoner Camp where Cpt. Gee related
to the Pangaean interrogators the situation. The Pangaeans,
by various means, tortured Quyet Thang and elicited the
desired intelligence. Based upon the intelligence thus ob-
tained, Federation forces proceeded to the rendezvous point,
engaged the 22nd Regiment and inflicted heavy casualties on
the enemy. Captured documents established that the 22nd had
had the following mission: The 1st Battalion was to act as
a screening force, attacking several Federation bases with
rockets and mortars allowing the 2nd and 3rd Battalions to
move between Federation positions. The 2nd Battalion was
to attack the Town of La Place, take the newly harvested rice
crop and assassinate the newly elected officials as well as the
teachers at the new town school. The 3rd Battalion had the
mission to destroy a Federation company guarding the town.
In January, 2091, Maj. Saster, Cpt. Gee and Lt. Short
were indicted for the torture of Quyet Thang.
PRIMUS, C. J.
As a member of the highest judicial body of this land, it
is my duty to uphold the laws of this land as enacted by the
Assembly so long as the enactment is constitutional. The case
before us today concerns an alleged violation of Act 16-51-35
of the Uniform Federation Laws, commonly known as the
Howe-Cohen Act. This specific section of the Howe-Cohen
Act is but one of several which was enacted to give the force
of law to the "rules of war" embodied in the Tenth Geneva
Accords. Act 16-51-35 is titled "Rules Relating to Treatment
of Prisoners of War" and Paragraph (b) states ". . . no
prisoner of war will be abused, mistreated or tortured in any
manner whatsoever by members of the Armed Forces of the
[Vol. 24796
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Federation . . . ." The three defendants stand accused of
violating this statute in the chain of events leading to the
torture of a prisoner of war.
The Indictment alleged that Lt. Short recommended,
Maj. Saster ordered, and Cpt. Gee acquiesced and aided in the
torture of one Quyet Thang by the Pangaean Army. I am
unable to sustain the lower Court's conviction of these de-
fendants and, since this is a situation of first impression in
this Court, I feel I must present my reasoning in some detail.
The first prerequisite to conviction for violating a given
law is the determination of the existence of that law. In other
words in a case such as the one before us, we must determine
if the alleged law is valid or invalid, for obviously if a "law"
is invalid, it does not exist and a non-existent law cannot be
violated.
As I have already stated, it is incumbent upon this Court
to uphold the legislative enactments of the Assembly so long
as they are not unconstitutional. It is true that laws are often
declared unconstitutional because they are unreasonable and
thereby violate the due process clause of our Constitution;
however, this case concerns a treaty, the Tenth Geneva Ac-
cords, between the Federation and the other signatories. The
treaty contains a provision under which each of the contract-
ing powers would undertake to pass laws to effectuate the
provisions of the Accord. Therefore, the first question is
whether this provision of the Howe-Cohen Act can be at-
tacked on the grounds of unconstitutionality, either because
of unreasonableness or any other constitutional ground.
The case of Gaines v. Dailey, 22 Federation 99, (2137),
relying heavily on an Old United States case of Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), answered this question in the
negative, saying "Acts of the Assembly must be made in pur-
suance of the Constitution, but treaties and statutes pursuant
to them are valid when made under the authority of the Fed-
eration. This is not to say there are no qualifications to the
treaty-making power, but these qualifications must be ascer-
tained in a different way."
Now we reach the crux of the problem. Because the stat-
ute was enacted pursuant to a treaty, it is not limited by the
Constitution but it is limited by other, as yet unnamed, "quali-
19721
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fications"; therefore, the problem before us now is to identify
these qualifications. To answer this question it is necessary
to examine the reason the treaty-making power must exist
and why it is not subject to normal constitutional limitations.
"It is obvious that there arise from time to time matters
of the sharpest exigency for the national well-being that an
act of the Assembly could not deal with but that a treaty
followed by such an act could deal with, and it is not lightly
to be assumed that in matters requiring national action a
power which must belong to and reside somewhere in every
civilized government is not to be found." Gaines at 103 para-
phrasing Missouri.
What the Court is saying in effect is that because of the
realities of the world situation there is a power inherent in
our government, as in all governments which exist as sover-
eigns in a community of nations, to enter into such agreements
with other nations as the national interest requires and that
this power is not necessarily limited by the Constitution. But
this power is not without qualifications or limits. The most
readily apparent qualification is that this power be used in
the national interest. However, this determination is made
by the Assembly. Are there other limits on this power? I
think-yes.
The treaty-making power is an inherent power of all
sovereign governments, but there are also inherent limits on
this power. The sovereign cannot command the impossible.
King Canute demonstrated this when he had himself carried
to the sea shore and ordered the tide not to come in. He did
this to prove to his subjects that he was not all powerful, for
he recognized inherent limits on his powers. In like manner
the sovereign cannot require men to do the impossible. I do
not think anyone would argue that a statute or a treaty that
required men to bear children would be valid. Such an order
would be unreasonable and without effect.
If a sovereign cannot legislate control over the elements
nor over the biological composition of men, can it be said he
can validly legislate the psychological make-up of men? The
answer is no. Just as the sovereign cannot validly legislate by
law or treaty that which is biologically impossible, he cannot
legislate that which is psychologically impossible. These de..
fendants, three Federation soldiers, were fighting in a war.
V798 [Vol. 24
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Hundreds of other Federation soldiers were being killed by
the enemy every week, and the lives of all our soldiers, includ-
ing the lives of these defendants, were in constant danger.
They were not in the chambers of a courtroom; they were at
war and wanted to survive. If man has any instinct at all, it
is the instinct to survive and to protect those whom he loves.
The enemy was moving to attack, to kill. Who were to be his
victims was unknown-maybe these men, maybe their friends,
maybe innocent civilians.
When a prisoner has become captured and is believed
beyond a reasonable doubt to possess information vital to the
defense and lives of our forces and he is refusing to divulge
that information, he is continuing to resist and constitutes
an immediate threat to our forces, just as if he still had a
weapon and was firing on our men. To forbid our forces while
engaged in war to neutralize the danger thus confronting
them would be equivalent to forbidding them the right to pro-
tect and defend their lives. This is an unreasonable restraint
upon their right of survival. In time of war, man's natural,
involuntary, instinctive determination to survive demands
that he take the necessary steps to protect himself, and no
government possesses the power to legislate away this instinct
to survive. It is as much beyond their power as the tides were
beyond Canute's.
For this reason, I conclude that the statute under which
the defendants were charged is without force and effect, and
the conviction should be set aside.
TRAY, J.
While I concur with the decision reached by my brother,
Primus, I find his reasoning completely unconvincing. I might
agree with my brother that a statute which commands the
impossible should not be given the effect of law, but the reason
for this arises from the very nature and purpose of law.
As I see it, the purpose of law is to regulate human con-
duct by setting standards which deviation from or conformity
to will bring into play sanctions or benefits enforced by the
powers of the government. From this I deduce three elements
necessary to every law: (1) First a law must set standards.
(2) Secondly, these standards must have as their object the
regulation of human conduct. (3) The standards must be gov-
ernmentally enforced.
1972] NOTEs
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I will discuss these necessary elements of every law in
reverse order. First, the standards must be governmentally
enforced. Governmental enforcement distinguishes law from
morality or private orders. Imagine these three situations:
First, a thief orders "Your money or your life." Secondly, a
religion, whose tenets are believed by the majority, has a
doctrine which states "Half of everyone's income must be
donated to the church or their souls will be lost." And thirdly,
a properly enacted statute which states "Each individual will
be taxed fifty percent of his gross income or serve two years
in jail." Which of these orders is a law? Obviously, only the
last, the properly enacted statute, is law.
Why? Because the government is recognized by citizens
of this body politic as the only body with the legitimate right
to make or enforce laws.
No problem arises with respect to laws that government
officials themselves enforce, but what about situations in
which private citizens are empowered to enforce the law. Does
this violate our third necessary element of all laws? No, be-
cause private citizens can only validly enforce laws when
empowered to so do by law.
In the medieval days a man who committed certain crimes
was declared an outlaw by the government. Part of his pun-
ishment was the withdrawing of governmental protection
over his person. The outlaw's life was forfeit to any indi-
vidual who could take it. But even this is not an example of an
individual enforcing a law, for the individual was acting with
governmental approval and was in effect an agent of the
government. Today we have pollution laws which allow pri-
vate citizens to institute proceedings against pollutors; but
this is not an example of private law enforcement. Even in
this situation, the private citizens are acting as quasi-govern-
mental officials. They are proceeding against pollutors as
defined by the government in a statute in a judicial system
provided by the government and in a manner set forth and
approved by the government.
Our statement of the third necessary element of a valid
law was that "The standards (set forth in the law) must be
governmentally enforced." We have shown that any enforce-
ment of a law is always of a governmental nature. But can
there be a valid law if no means of enforcement are pre-
scribed?
[Vol. 24
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Let us postulate a situation in which the Assembly pro-
mulgates a statute which says "All persons will remove hats
when entering government buildings," but no sanctions are
provided. Is this a law? The statute establishes the necessary
standards and is designed to regulate human conduct but no
means are provided for its enforcement. It is, therefore, not
a law but only a resolution of the Assembly. Moral principles
set standards for and are designed to regulate human conduct
but are not laws because they are not enforced by the gov-
ernment. Therefore, we can conclude that "it is a necessary
element of a valid law that the standards set forth in the
statute" must be governmentally enforced.
The second necessary element for a valid law is that
"these standards (set forth in the law) must have as their
object the regulation of human conduct." I would agree with
Judge Primus that there cannot at present be a valid law
designed to regulate the ebb and flow of the oceans' tides nor
the rising and setting of the sun. These are instances of physi-
cal elements in our world that at present are utterly beyond
our control; and, therefore, beyond our power to regulate or
legislate. But we can and do legislate man's relationship to
these elements. An individual's title rights stop at the mean
high tide mark and certain human activities are forbidden
at night.
Since in the past generation we have learned how to con-
trol the amount of rainfall in a given locale, some will point
to a law stating "X area is to receive between thirty to forty
inches of precipitation a year" as a law regulating the environ-
ment and not human conduct. This is incorrect. The correct
view of this law is to view it as one directing and empowering
the personnel of the Weather Bureau to supply this amount of
precipitation each year. Thus, this law is regulating the con-
duct of humans in their relationship among themselves and
the amount of precipitation.
There is a law in many jurisdictions of the Federation
to the effect that dogs found running in packs will be shot.
Properly viewed, this law is not designed to regulate the ac-
tivities of dogs, for obviously animals are incapable of per-
ceiving laws. This law is designed to put the dog owners on
notice of the possible results of failing to keep their dogs
under control and empowers law enforcement officials to kill
1972]
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dogs running in packs without being liable to the dogs' own-
ers. Therefore, this law is designed to regulate the activities,
rights and duties of men in connection with the behavior of
dogs.
The only creature capable of conceiving, perceiving,
understanding and conforming to laws is man; therefore, it
is axiomatic that the regulation of human conduct, including
the activities, rights, duties and relationships of men, is the
only proper object of law.
The remaining necessary element of all laws requires
that they must set forth standards. We have already shown
that the regulation of human conduct is the only proper ob..
ject of laws. Only man is able to understand and conform to
laws; but if a "law" does not set forth sufficient standards
by which a man may judge his conduct, he is in no better
position than a brute creature.
If a man does not know and cannot ascertain the stan..
dards he must follow in order to be in compliance with an
enactment, this enactment is not law for it must fail in its
primary purpose-the regulation of human conduct. Men can-
not obey nor government enforce a law whose standards and
requirements cannot be discovered by anyone. There are many
laws in this land that are unintelligible to most people. Among
these laws I would number our tax laws. But at least the
standards and requirements these laws place on human con-
duct can be ascertained by specialists. I have no quarrel with
complex laws having complex standards, but I do object most
strenuously to enactments that set forth no standards at all;
and it is these standardless enactments that I would deny the
force of law.
The statute under which the present action was brought
complies with the three necessary elements of law which I
have set forth. It is designed to regulate human conduct and
there are provisions for its enforcement by the government.
The statute also provides the necessary standards to govern
conduct.
Once a statute complies with these three prerequisites it
is a valid law and the standards encompassed in it must be
applied to the instant situation to determine if the defendants
have failed to measure up to the required standards. The stat-
ute states "no prisoner of war will be abused, mistreated or
[Vol. 24
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tortured." It is admitted Quyet Thang was a prisoner of war
and was tortured. The statute further states the forbidden
acts will not be done "by members of the Armed Forces of
the Federation." It is this phrase in the statute which destroys
the prosecution's case. The prisoner, Quyet Thang, was not
tortured by the defendants but by members of another army.
The prosecution would use a conspiracy theory to convict
the defendants, imputing the torture of the prisoner by the
Pangaeans to the defendants. The potential harm of accepting
such a theory is catastrophic. What standards would be left
by which men could judge their acts?
Under the conspiracy theory, Maj. Saster, who ordered
the prisoner turned over to the Pangaeans, would be guilty.
What should Maj. Saster have done? Our forces do not main-
tain P. 0. W. camps. All prisoners, within a short time, are
turned over to the Pangaeans. In this case the Pangaeans
knew the importance of Quyet Thang and it is likely they
would have tortured the prisoner without any prompting.
Even if he had not suggested torture, it is possible, under the
charge of conspiracy, to convict Maj. Saster if he turned the
prisoner over to the Pangaeans believing he would be tortured,
yet if he had refused to turn the prisoner over he would have
been in violation of Military Regulations. Where are the neces-
sary standards?
Lt. Short was under orders to interrogate Quyet Thang
and recommend a course of action to follow. Under the con-
spiracy theory if this situation arises again, what should the
soldier do?
Cpt. Gee, according to the conspiracy theory, should be
convicted because he acquiesced and aided in the torture.
Specifically, Cpt. Gee picked up and delivered Quyet Thang
to the Pangaeans and relayed Maj. Saster's suggestions. If we
convict Cpt. Gee, what standards do we have to guide men in
similar situations? Should Cpt. Gee have refused the order,
valid on its face, to pick up the prisoner and risked a Court
Martial for refusal to obey an order in time of war?
If we accept the conspiracy theory, why are only these
three defendants before us? Should not the clerk typist who
typed the prisoner's transfer orders also be indicted for he
too knew Thang was likely to be tortured. Where are the
standards for him? Should he refuse to type? Where is Cpt.
1972] NOTES 803
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Gee's driver? Should he not also be charged with facilitating
the torture for he personally transported the prisoner to the
Pangaeans and he knew of Maj. Saster's suggestions. Should
the driver have refused to drive? Where are the generals who
knew of these practices but who did nothing to halt them?
If we accept the conspiracy theory in this situation and
proceed into a standardless wilderness, would it not be pos-
sible to use a variation of the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine to forbid our forces from acting on such ill-gotten
information. After Thang had been tortured, the information
obtained was given to a Federation soldier who transmitted it
to our fighting units. Could this soldier not be an accessory
after the fact? In the future should he refuse to pass on
needed intelligence? Since this intelligence was "fruit of the
poisonous tree" were the commanders of our combat units
guilty of misdeeds when they acted on it? In the future should
they refuse to use ill-gotten intelligence, thereby risking a
Court Martial, and letting Federation soldiers suffer the con-
sequences or should they continue to press intelligence officers
to get the information they need and perhaps be accessories
before the fact? Where are the necessary standards?
Were I to accept the conspiracy theory in this case, I
would have to strike down the statute as lacking the necessary
standards. Therefore, in order to save the statute it must be
interpreted narrowly. Since the defendants did not personally
engage in the torture of the prisoner, their conviction must
be reversed.
SUMMERFALL, J.
I am quite disappointed in the opinions and decisions of
my colleagues, Primus and Tray. The law is quite plain "...
no prisoner of war will be abused, mistreated or tortured in
any manner whatsoever by members of the Armed Forces
of the Federation . . . ." Judge Primus' opinion notwith-
standing, there is nothing unreasonable about this law. It
does not demand the impossible. It only asks, fiay demands,
that our soldiers refrain from the barbarous practice of tor-
menting soldiers of other nations that fall into their hands
and are completely at their mercy. There are instances on
record of men in similar circumstances acting in a manner
in accord with the law. Judge Primus believes that basically
this law and others of a like ilk are an unwise limitation on
804 [Vol. 24
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our armed forces and it offends his sense of justice to punish
men for doing what he believes the necessities of war de-
manded. Judge Primus in effect places his idea of the neces-
sities of war in a position superior to the law. This is a grave
judicial error.
We are a government of laws, not men. This means in
effect that what is legal is just and that which is illegal is
unjust. Our laws are enacted by our Assembly as the embodi-
ment of the will of the people. And when our people, through
the Assembly, enact legislation they are stating the standard
of justice, of laws, to be enforced in our land. If the Assembly
declares that corporations will be taxed $.75 on the dollar and
individuals, $.25 on the dollar, then the people feel this is just
and what judge would have the audacity to declare that this
act is unjust and invalid? But this is what Judge Primus has
done in the case before us, though he tried to disguise his
motives by postulating it in terms of impossibility, unreason-
ableness and inherent limits on the enacting of valid laws.
As an aside I would like to take issue with those who look
aghast at my statement that "what is legal is just and that
which is illegal is unjust" and would transpose the words to
state that what is just is legal and that which is unjust is
illegal. The validity of the latter statement is utterly illusion-
ary. Undoubtedly it has appeal since such a theory would
recognize only "just" laws as valid and thus any law which
was unjust would, of course, be invalid, an "unlaw" if you
will, and not worthy of recognition or obediency. Such a
theory would give moral sanction to, if indeed it did not com-
mand, the contravention of these unjust unlaws.
How is it that I a Justice on our Supreme Court can op-
pose a theory that would allow only just laws to exist? The
answer is very simple, I am a judge not a philosopher, I deal
in laws not theories, I am interested in the practical ameliora-
tion of harsh conditions, not in the impractical pursuit of
perfection.
In this world most things are transient, few constant.
Among those which I would number constant are people, gov-
ernments, and laws. These three in some form have existed
since the beginning of recorded history and perhaps it is time
we learned from history instead of just memorizing it. Wher-
ever people are found they are organized, be it into clans,
19721 NOTES
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tribes, or nations. All of which constitute various forms of
governments and all these governments attempt to regulate
the conflicts between individuals by means of various rules,
be they custom or governmental rules, called laws. Since when-
ever men are found in groups we also find government and
law it is not amiss to realize that they are necessary for the
existence of man and therefore any theory which would
render ineffectual either the government or law would destroy
the prerequisites of man's existence and would therefore un-
doubtedly be false.
A theory postulating that what is just is legal and what
is unjust is illegal could be paraded forth anytime someone
needed a justification for some action. So long as the alleged
reason for the act was claimed to be just such a theory would
hold that it was legal; but since men have never been able to
agree on what is just such a theory would leave them unable
to collectively ascertain what was legal. Thus, every man
would be a law unto himself and the result would be anarchy,
or the lack of effectual government and law, which history
has shown to be inimical to the existence of man. Therefore,
a theory which states that what is just is legal and what is
unjust is illegal is unworkable and thereby false.
Returning to the case at bar, at least Judge Primus was
addressing himself to the case at bar, not propounding a
theory on the necessary elements of a law. It is not necessary
that a law contain Judge Tray's three elements before it is
valid. The prerequisites for validity of laws are set forth by
every people in their constitution, be it written or unwritten.
It is possible for a people to say in effect "We recognize every
wish of the lawgiver as law" and, if the people do so recog-
nize, then the every wish of the lawgiver is law. If the law-
giver commands that every man bear a child or be fined $100,
that is the law even if impossible. Why is it law? Because it
is recognized as law by the people. Nor must the lawgiver
set standards before his laws are valid. The lawgiver may
walk the streets of this capital decreeing laws as the whim
strikes him, disposing of property and lives without any stan-
dards at all. To decide this case we need not look to inherent
limits on laws in order to do justice; for what the people,
through laws properly enacted by our Assembly, command is
justice. Nor do we look to theoretically necessary elements of
[Vol. 24
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law for the only limits to the validity of laws are those pre-
scribed in our Constitution.
I am cognizant that one of the defenses raised by the
defendants was that they did not personally torture Quyet
Thang and the statute only forbids torture "... by members
of the Armed Forces of the Federation ." I am not per-
suaded by this argument. If a man murders another with a
pistol, he will not be heard to raise the defense that the pistol,
not he, did the killing, for the pistol would be just an instru-
ment of his will. In this situation the defendants knew the
Pangaeans would comply with their request for this was in
military parlance a standard operating procedure. Thus, the
Pangaeans were just as much an instrument of the defen-
dants' will as the pistol in the hypothetical.
I would like to warn my colleagues and my beloved nation
of one possible consequence should the convictions of the
defendants be overturned. There are two ways of policing
war crimes: (1) self regulation in which the parent nation
punishes its citizens who -transgress the laws of war; or, (2)
await the enforcement of the laws of war by international
tribunals.
If a nation does not police itself, the international tri-
bunals can be expected that only the vanquished nation would
allow itself to be placed on trial as was the case in the "Nur-
emberg Trials." Though in their day these trials were heralded
as a great advance in international jurisprudence and the
cause of justice, they might more appropriately be viewed as
a return to the barbarous practice of execution of the van-
quished by the victor. Those "trials" remind one of Roman
Triumphs in which the rulers and important personages of
vanquished nations were paraded in public view to glorify
their victors prior to being executed. At least the prevailing
rulers of World War II did not use their defeated counter-
parts' gold plated skulls as drinking vessels, as some "ancient"
barbarian conquerors were wont to do; but it is doubtful if
this fact was any consolation to the executed rulers.
It is precisely because of my aversion to the victors' pass-
ing judgments on the losers that I feel that each nation must
police the acts of its own soldiers. In order to effectuate this
self-regulation our nation has enacted domestic statutes defin-
ing war crimes. But there are those who would emasculate
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these statutes by an insidious use of the doctrine of "military
necessity" or the concept of "proportionality."
Under the doctrine of military necessity if an act was
committed which had been declared illegal but which act was
necessary for the successful prosecution of the war, then the
act was lawful; however, if the act was unnecessary or unre-
lated to the achievement of war aims it was illegal and should
be punished. Under the doctrine of "proportionality" the only
acts that would be illegal and therefore punishable would be
those that were disproportionately brutal to those engaged
in by the enemy.
If either of these doctrines was given official sanction
by this Court, it could be used to invalidate a statute duly
enacted by the representatives of the people of the Republic.
A general could order an act in direct contravention of a stat-
ute of the Federation and then perhaps effectively justify his
act as a "military necessity" or as being "proportionate" to
the acts of the enemy. In fact, were the doctrine of propor-.
tionality adopted we would be faced with the ultimate irony
of our enemy in time of war being empowered to repeal the
laws of war of the Federation. For by the commission of a
heinous act of war by the enemy the enemy will have nullified
any domestic prohibition against any proportionally brutal
acts by our troops. Such a result is preposterous.
We have a duly enacted statute regulating the acts of our
soldiers in time of war. It is time we recognize this fact and
deal with the present situation in light of the existing law.
I have no problem disposing of this case under a simple
conspiracy theory. The lieutenant who recommended, the
major who ordered, and the captain who knowingly facilitated
the torture were all engaged in a conspiracy to violate a law
of the Federation. Neither good intentions, selfless motives
nor beneficial results vitiates their actions, for the salient fact
remains, these men violated a law of the Federation and it is
not within our power to forgive their deeds.
I know my opinion will be attacked as unduly harsh, as
being in fact unjust. I will be scathingly attacked for equating
justice with law and I will admit that for the layman the law
may often seem unjust; but I and my colleagues are judges.
Hopefully, we dispense justice. This is our aim. But what
standards, what yardstick, what scales are we to use to arrive
808 [Vol. 24
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at justice? Every group, nay every man, has his own idea
of justice and I, as a man, have my own ideas of justice. But,
when I enter this courtroom, I enter not as an individual but
as a judge, a representative of the people. It is incumbent
upon me, a duty of this office, that I leave all my prejudices
and personal feelings, even my personal ideas of justice, out-
side this courtroom. As a judge, my standard of justice is
provided for me and this standard is called the law.
Provided the correct procedural steps set forth in our
Constitution are followed, the laws enacted are valid. These
laws represent the will of the people acting through their
elected representatives in the Assembly. Imperfect though
this system may be, it does allow competing ideas of justice,
of oughts and ought nots, of rights and wrongs, of philosophy,
of political ideas and ideals to meet in combat and to com-
promise and synthesize into one result binding on all, the law.
It is highly improbable that any one man will ever agree with
all our laws or that all men will ever consider any one law
just. Each individual will consider many of them unjust and
this is his right as a citizen. But when that individual sits
upon the bench, he is sworn to uphold the laws of this great
nation, not his own personal ideas of justice. We pride our-
selves on being a nation governed by laws, not men, and any
theory which allows one man to place his own ideas, be they
on justice or politics, above the laws of this land perverts the
very system he is sworn to uphold. Judges must accept the
laws of this nation as their standard of justice and render
decisions in accord therewith. If the people become dissatis-
fied with this brand of justice according to law, then they
may change the law and provide the judges with a new stan-
dard of justice. If, however, judges dispense justice not ac-
cording to law, but according to their own personal and pri-
vate ideals, how then can the people, if dissatisfied with this
brand of justice, change it?
It is therefore necessary that judges decide the cases before
them in accordance with the law, whether or not they per-
sonally agree with the law. When a judge attempts by legal
sophistry to circumvent the result demanded by law, solely
because of a personal predilection at variance with the law,
then that judge is unfit for the office he holds. If my col-
leagues will dissociate themselves from their personal preju-
dices and apply the facts of the case before us to the law
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given to us to govern in situations such as that before us,
they will conclude, as I have, that the conviction on these three
defendants must be sustained.
IKATZ, J.
This law has been attacked as being unreasonable, be-
cause it would have forced the defendants to restrain from
doing an act which would further their interests. It has also
been labeled an unjust law, because our citizens do not like
our laws punishing our own soldiers for acts which, it is felt,
duty as well as their innate patriotic ardor impelled them
to do. Our people are schizophrenic about the subject of tor..
ture in war. They decry as barbaric the torture of our men
by the enemy, claiming that our men should only be required
to give their name, rank and service number and date of birth.
We have, in fact, convicted many enemy soldiers in previous
wars of committing war crimes of the very type before us
today. Now, many of our people object to our punishing our
own soldiers for commiting such acts. However the objection
is phrased, be it in terms of law or human nature, it can all
be reduced to one simple fact: We demand the right to torture
the enemy prisoner, but deny our enemy a like right. Indi-
viduals of this persuasion claim it is unjust for us to punish
these defendants; but they would be the first to demand, in
the name of justice, that we punish an enemy guilty of tor-
turing any of our men. The men holding such ideas completely
misunderstand the purpose of laws and the nature of justice.
It was about such men as these that Plato spoke in a passage
of his Republic, concerning the origin and nature of justice:
"They say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer in-
justice, evil; but that the evil is greater than the good. And so when
men have both done and suffered injustice and have had experience
of both, not being able to avoid the one and obtain the other, they
think that they had better agree among themselves to have neither;
hence there arise laws and mutual covenants; and that which is or-
dained by law is termed by them lawful and just. This they affirm to
be the origin and nature of justice; -it is a mean or compromise, be-
tween the best of all, which is to do injustice and not be punished,
and the worst of all, which is to suffer injustice without the power of
retaliation; and justice, being at a middle point between the two is
tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and honoured by reason
of the inability of men to do injustice. For no man who is worthy to
be called a man would ever submit to such an agreement if he were
able to resist; he would be mad if he did. Such is the received ac-
count, Socrates, of the nature and origin of justice." (Republic,
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Book II, First Dialogue Between Socrates and Glaucon, Jowert Trans-
lation).
Since we as a nation are unable by brute force to pre-
vent the torture of our soldiers by the enemy, we are in the
position of two men having suffered and inflicted hurt on
each other. The only rational, the only reasonable course is
to mitigate the hurt and it is to this end that laws are enacted.
Thus, justice is in fact simply a compromise between doing
and suffering hurt and law is the means agreed upon to effec-
tuate justice.
Individuals who operate on a visceral level often equate
justice with that which they desire. It is about these individ-
uals (or nations) that Thomas Hobbes in the Leviathan spoke,
saying:
"But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that
is it which he for his part calls good; and the objects of his hate and
aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these
words of good, evil and contemptible are ever used with relation to
the person that uses them, there being nothing simply and absolutely
so, nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature
of the objects themselves . . ." (Chapter 6, p. 53-1958 Bobbs-Merrill
Co., Inc. Edition)
Then there are those other individuals who, operating
on a more esoteric level, perhaps aspiring to be "philosophers,"
equate justice with that which they believe they should desire.
These "noble" men attempt to disassociate themselves from
their base instincts and search for the pure, ultimate truth.
The truth having always existed, being immutable and un-
changeable, though undiscovered until revealed by the "noble
philosopher." While these individuals could be answered by
Hobbes' previous statement, I would prefer to answer them
in the words of Friedrich Nietzsche:
"In every philosophy there comes the point where the philosopher's
'conviction' enters the scene-or, in the words of an ancient mystery,
adventazit asinus
pulcher et fortissimes.*
(Beyond Good and Evil-Sec. 8)
It (philosophy) always creates the world in its own image;
it cannot do otherwise, for philosophy is this tyrannical desire; it is
the most spiritual will to power, to 'creation of the world' to the
causa prima."
(Beyond Good and Evil-Latter part, Sec. 9)
* Entered now the ass
Beautiful and most strong.
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Speaking to the metaphysicians solemnly searching for
their "truth," Nietzsche had this to say:
"The basic faith of all metaphysicians is faith in the antithetical
nature of value. It has never occurred to the most cautious of them,
even though they had taken a vow to "doubt everything," to pause in
doubt at the very threshold where doubt would have been most neces-
sary. But we may indeed doubt; first, whether antitheses exist at all,
and second, whether those popular valuations and value-antitheses
upon which the metaphysicians have placed their stamp of approval
are not perhaps merely superficial valuations, merely provisional per-
spectives-and perspectives from a right comer at that possibly from
below, a "worm's eye view" so to speak. Admitting all the value ac-
corded to the true, the faithful, the selfless, it is nonetheless possible
that a higher value should be ascribed to appearance, to the will to
deception, to self-interest, to greed-a higher value with respect to all
life. Furthermore, it is quite possible that the very value of those good
and honored things consists, in fact, in their insidious relatedness to
these wicked, seemingly opposite things-it could be that they are
inextricably bound up, entwined, perhaps even similar in their very
nature. Perhaps! But who is willing to be troubled by such a perilous
Perhaps? We must wait for a new species of philosopher to arrive,
who will have some other, opposite taste and inclinations than the pre-
vious ones. Philosophers of the Perilous Perhaps, in every sense. And
seriously, I can see such new philosophers coming up over the horizon.
(Beyond Good and Evil-Sec. 2)
For too long man has reasoned that justice must be the
antithesis of injustice. Justice being viewed as positive, in..
justice being negative, justice as good, injustice as bad. There
is also the view that there always exists a just solution; that
this just solution is good for all and that where justice exists
injustice by definition does not exist. Viewed thusly, justice
and injustice appear to be the antithesis of each other, the
existence of one denying the existence of the other within the
same sphere. Philosophers have come and gone, influencing
men and nations for longer or shorter periods of time but none
have been able to satisfactorily define what justice is in a
positive sense. For thousands of years men have tried to de-
fine justice in terms of its elements, to give it a positive
nature; but all the definitions have proven fallacious. Since
man has been unable to discover the positive of justice perhaps
the reason for this lies in the essence of justice, perhaps
(Nietzsche's perilous perhaps) justice is not positive.
It is time to reevaluate justice and demand of it not the
effectuation of good but instead merely the minimalization
of harm. We must not pursue a utopia but instead seek realism
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and rationality. History has shown the limited and imperfect
character of human nature, and that man is often motivated
by ambition, avarice, lust, revenge, hate, ignorance, sagacity,
anger, resentment, jealousy, stupidity, and irrationality. It is
time for us to deal with men and their institutions as they
are and as they have been throughout history and to realize
that if men were angels no government would be necessary.
It is time to awaken from the deceitful dream that somewhere
there exists a golden orb which if only discovered will dis-
pense justice to all and adopt a practical maxim for the
direction of human activities. The minds and behavior of citi-
zens are continually disturbed and corrupted by self-interest
and different opinions will always be formed. Out of the dif-
ference of opinions will rise conflicts and tensions that must
be ameliorated.
Men always would prefer to have their own way. But
being unable to achieve this and fearing the imposition of
others' will on them they look for means to ameliorate the
harm they might suffer and to this end they enact laws which
embody compromises between the various competing interests
and to the extent that the laws mitigate the hurt each party
might suffer the laws are just.
There are those who say that if their position is just, then
to compromise is unjust; that to compromise justice with in-
justice is an injustice. Perhaps, those men are wrong. Per-
haps, if after thousands of years men have been unable to
distinguish justice from injustice we should examine our basic
premises. Perhaps, justice and injustice are not unrelated.
Perhaps, justice does not have an independent existence sep-
arate from injustice. Perhaps, we demand too much of justice.
Man has attempted to assign a positive value to justice-
the promotion of good-but has been unable to identify and
agree upon what is just using this view. Since justice has been
assigned a positive value and negative value-the promotion
of evil. This view is unrealistic and wrong.
What we call justice is merely man's attempt to mitigate
man's injustice to man. That is to say, it is a compromise
between doing and suffering injustice. Contrary to being the
antithesis of injustice, justice is the middle ground between
injustices. Justice is not the antithesis of injustice but the
synthesis of injustice. It is not a positive force, but a neutral-
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izing or mitigating force, designed to neutralize or minimize
harm.
Viewed in this light, it can be seen that the law before
us in in fact just. And contrary to the opinion of some, it is
not unreasonable. It is in fact the only reasonable path for a
solution to the problem of mutual torture of prisoners. If this
problem and others of a like nature between nations are ever
to be solved, the compromise theory of justice must be adopted
and laws enacted to effectuate this theory must be enforced.
I must, therefore, affirm the conviction of the defendants.
ORDO, J.
I am deeply disturbed by this case and the previous
opinions. If any of the theories set forth in these decisions
were to be adopted by this nation, it would be destructive of
our legal system. Actually, I am not very surprised at Judge
Summerfall's opinion, for he has long and tediously labored
against any restraints on the power of the government. Judge
Summerfall dislikes the fact that the purpose of our Constitu-
tion and our fundamental principles of justice are designed
to limit the power of the government, our sovereign. He would
apparently agree as Thomas Hobbes said in his Leviathan
". .. no law can be unjust. The law is made by the sovereign
power, and all that is done by such power is warranted and
owned by everyone of the people; and that which every man
will have so, no man can say is unjust." But, if I may, I would
hasten to remind my brother that Hobbes died in 1679, many
years prior to the writing of our Constitution. The drafters
of our Constitution knew of the writing of Hobbes and re..
jected them by implanting in our Constitution limits on the
power of our government to enact laws. This Constitution is
the fundamental law of our land; it is the standard by which
I must judge any enactment of the Assembly. It may be true
that we must judge the acts of individuals by the standards
provided by our laws, but let us not forget that we must judge
and pass upon the validity of our laws by the standards pro-
vided in our Constitution.
I am also distressed by Judge Tray's opinion, but will
address myself to only one point therein. He states that a law
must be governmentally enforced and that, if not, it is not a
valid law and would presumably be without force. If we accept
this line of reasoning then our Constitution, which is funda-
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mental law, is invalid; for although it gives or restricts our
rights and powers it does not contain within itself sanctions
to be enforced if someone acts in an unconstitutional manner.
I could continue criticizing my brother, but this would
not alleviate the problem with which I am now faced; namely,
how do I decide this case. My initial reaction was to condemn
the acts of the defendants as immoral, but is it not possible
that the moral duty the defendants owed their fellow soldiers
superceded any other moral duty? I do not know what course
of action I would have felt bound to follow in a similar situa-
tion; therefore, I cannot find it in my heart to subject these
men to moral condemnation, whatever is the outcome of this
case.
Concerning the interpretation of the statute under which
the defendants were indicted, there are two avenues open to
us. First, we could interpret the statute broadly and impute
the acts of the Panagaeans to the defendants since they did
aid and abet the acts of the Panagaeans. Or, we can interpret
it very narrowly and find the defendants not guilty since they
did not personally participate in the acts of torture.
We as judges serve two masters, the law and justice, and
where one of our masters, in this case the law, does not give
us adequate guidance, we must look to the other. Since we
have a choice of interpretations, it behooves us to take the
path that is more just.
What would be the effect of interpreting this statute
broadly? Another section of this Act states in effect that
P.O.W.'s will be accorded the same medical treatment as that
given our own forces. It is also a fact that in war there are
often shortages in medical supplies. Let us now imagine a sit-
uation in which eight seriously wounded men, four Federation
soldiers and four enemy soldiers are brought to a medical
officer. Let's also imagine that all of these men will die with-
out certain medication but that the medical officer only has
enough for four men. This officer now has a dilemma, for he
must choose four men to die.
What is the medical officer's moral duty in this situation?
'If he cannot save them all, is not his primary duty to save
his comrades first and his enemies second? Our nation would
be outraged if the medical officer saved two Federation and
two enemy soldiers and allowed our other two men to die
1972]
21
Byars: The Case of the Ill-Gotten Intelligence
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
because of lack of medication; but is this not the result that
the statute decreeing equal medical treatment may demand?
Is it possible our legislators meant to punish doctors for sav-
ing our soldiers first? Or, was it not actually our legislators'
intent to halt the practice of maliciously depriving P. 0. W.'s
of medical treatment? I believe the latter to be the purpose
of the P. 0. W. medical treatment statute and, therefore, the
medical officer would not be guilty.
The defendants before us were faced with a choice similar
to the one that the doctor faced. They could leave the prisoner
alone and thereby sentence Federation soldiers to death or
they could have the Pangaeans inflict pain on the prisoner
and save Federation lives. If we would find the doctor not
guilty in our imagined situation, because he acted without
malice, should we not apply the same principle to the de-
fendants?
I feel justice demands that laws such as the one before
us be applied with due regard to the necessities of war. This
principle has been adhered to in applying similar laws in
other wars. Prior to World War II aerial bombardment of
populated areas had been outlawed. Note, however, that in
the trials following that war no one was convicted for com-
mitting these acts. The reason for this is quite obvious; these
acts were done because of military necessity and without
malice.
All nations have certain inherent rights and this includes
the right to declare war and send the soldiers to fight. The
right to war is a basic right of a sovereign to insure its con-
tinued existence. The existence of a state of war between
sovereign entities admits of an irreconcilable difference that
has erupted into a struggle which of necessity endangers the
existence of the sovereign entities. As with any being whose
continued existence is threatened, the embattled state has the
right to take such actions as are necessary to obviate the
danger of oblivion. Since a sovereign state in time of war has
a right to engage in actions sufficient and necessary to insure
its existence, it follows that soldiers, in fulfillment of their
duty to defend their nation in time of war, are required to
take any steps that are militarily necessary to further the
successful prosecution of the war.
Granting that all sovereign entities have an inherent
right, perhaps, even a responsibility to take whatever acts are
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necessary to prevent adverse military results in time of war,
it should be obvious that statutes such as that before us today
are not designed to prohibit acts that are militarily necessary
but is instead only designed to prohibit the designated acts
when engaged in without the justification of military neces-
sity. Any other interpretation would verge on the criminally
ridiculous.
To refuse to recognize the doctrine of military necessity
so urged by Justice Summerfall could and would place the
soldiers in an impossible dilemma. Soldiers in situations sim-
ilar to the one faced by these defendants would have to decide
between death for their comrades or prison for themselves.
To give free rein to our imagination, let us postulate a future
situation in which the Federation has developed weapon X
and that a statute has been enacted barring its use in time
of war. Let us further assume that the Federation is losing the
war and is in danger of enslavement by the enemy nation.
What would Justice Summerfall have the soldiers in charge
of weapon X do? Would he have them heed his interpretation
of this statute and stay their hands, submitting our nation
to slavery, or would he have them use weapon X and save the
nation by what he would term a breach of the law. If these
saviors of the nation were brought before Justice Summerfall,
would he have them committed to prison for violating a law
of the Federation? It would be the ultimate irony to use the
very laws these men preserved to imprison them for the very
act that preserved the laws. Such an interpretation of the
statute is unreasonable and therefore incorrect. The differ-
ences in the situation and acts of the soldiers in the hypo-
thetical situation and that of the defendants before us today
are only of degree, not substance.
I believe that justice, justice for our fighting men, and
our nation, decrees that the statute before us be interpreted
and applied in a manner that allows our soldiers to do what
the necessities of war demand. The conviction of the defen-
dants should be reversed.
PRIMUS, C. J.
It is, therefore, the judgment of this Court that the
decision of the lower Court be reversed.
WILLIAM R. BYARS, JR.
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